This paper examines the long-run effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and industrial policies on innovation and technology transfer using a North-South quality ladder model where licensing is the main mode of technology transfer to developing countries. We show that the governments of developing countries can promote innovation and technology transfer by strengthening IPR protection, which is enforced by restricting the imitation of products. Moreover, the results also imply that subsidies on the cost of license negotiation can promote innovation and technology transfer, whereas subsidies on the cost of R&D have no effect.
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Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number
07-05.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Coe, David T & Helpman, Elhanan & Hoffmaister, Alexander, 1995.
"North-South R&D Spillovers,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1133, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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David T. Coe & Elhanan Helpman & Alexander Hoffmaister, 1995.
"North-South R&D Spillovers,"
NBER Working Papers
5048, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)