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Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate

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Author Info
Luisa Carpente (Universidade da Coruna)
Balbina Casas-Mendez (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)
Ignacio Garcia-Jurado (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)
Anne van den Nouweland () (University of Oregon)
Abstract

In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games.

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File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2005-16_Nouweland_Interval.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2005-16.

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Length: 36
Date of creation: 22 Sep 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2005-16

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Related research
Keywords: Strategic Games; Coalitional Interval Games; Superadditive Games; Axiomatic Characterization;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Branzei, R. & Dimitrov, D. & Pickl, S. & Tijs, S., 2002. "How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims?," Discussion Paper 96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Rodica Branzei & Dinko Dimitrov & Stef Tijs, 2003. "Shapley-like values for interval bankruptcy games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(9), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  3. Luisa Carpente & Balbina Casas-Méndez & Ignacio García-Jurado & Anne van den Nouweland, 2005. "Values for strategic games in which players cooperate," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 397-419, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luisa Carente & Balbina Casas-Mendez & Ignacio Carcia-Jurado & Anne van den Nouweland, 2007. "The Truncated Core for Games with Limited Aspirations," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1010, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  2. Anne van den Nouweland & Luisa Carpente & Balbina Casas-Méndez & Ignacio García-Jurado, 2007. "The truncated core for games with limited aspirations," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2007-13, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alparslan-Gok, S.Z. & Branzei, R. & Tijs, S.H., 2008. "Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games," Discussion Paper 2008-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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