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The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate

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Author Info
Luisa Carpente (Universidade da Coruna)
Ignacio Garcia-Jurado (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)
Balbina Casas-Mendez (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)
Anne van den Nouweland () (University of Oregon)
Abstract

In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these playersÂ’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lowervalue based method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2003). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function.

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File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2004-3_Carpente_Shapley.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2004-3.

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Length: 12
Date of creation: 19 Feb 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2004-3

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Luisa Carpente & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Balbina Casas-Mendez & Anne van den Nouweland, 2003. "Values for strategic games in which players cooperate," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2003-5, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  2. Norde, H. & Voorneveld, M., 2003. "Axiomatizations of the value of matrix games," Discussion Paper 17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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