The Formation of Communication Networks in Cooperative Games
AbstractI survey the literature on network formation in situations where the possible gains from cooperation of coalitions of agents are modeled by a coalitional game. I discuss the models that appear in the literature and their predictions on the networks that will be formed according to various equilibrium concepts, as well as the eventual payoffs to the players in equilibrium networks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2004-2.
Date of creation: 08 Jan 2004
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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