Bank Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation
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- Friederike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013. "Bank Bailouts, International Linkages, and Cooperation," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 270-305, November.
- Friederike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2011. "Bank Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3384, CESifo.
- Niepmann, Friederike & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim, 2010. "Bank bailouts, international linkages and cooperation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121902, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Friederike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2010. "Bank Bail-Outs, International Linkages and Cooperation," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/05, European University Institute.
- Friederike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2010. "Bank Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation," CEP Discussion Papers dp1023, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Friederike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2010. "Bank Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation," Working Papers 1016, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
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Cited by:
- Fidrmuc, Jarko & Hake, Mariya & Stix, Helmut, 2013.
"Households’ foreign currency borrowing in Central and Eastern Europe,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1880-1897.
- Jarko Fidrmuc & Mariya Hake & Helmut Stix, 2011. "Households’ Foreign Currency Borrowing in Central and Eastern Europe," Working Papers 171, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
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More about this item
Keywords
bailout; contagion; financial crisis; international institutional arrangements;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2011-05-30 (Banking)
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