Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Industrial Espionage with a Noisy Intelligence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Yair Tauman

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Stony Brook University)

  • Alex Barrachina

    ()
    (University of Valencia and ERI-CES.)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We analyze industrial espionage in a model of two firms: a monopoly incumbent, M, and a potential entrant, E, who owns a noisy intelligence system (IS) of a certain precision a . The IS generates a signal on M’s action and E decides whether or not to enter based on this signal. We show that if a is commonly known, M is the one who benefits from a perfect IS and E who spies on M prefers a less accurate IS. If however a is a private information of E, the opposite result is obtained. E is best off with a perfect IS and M with a less accurate one.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sunysb.edu/economics/research/papers/2012/IndustrialEspionagewithaNoisyIntelligence.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2012
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Stony Brook University, Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 12-06.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Aug 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:12-06

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Stony Brook, NY 11794-4384
    Phone: (631)632-7540
    Fax: (631)632-7516
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.stonybrook.edu/economics
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Espionage; Monopoly; Entry; Asymmetric information; Signaling game.;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Manishi Prasad & Peter Wahlqvist & Rich Shikiar & Ya-Chen Tina Shih, 2004. "A," PharmacoEconomics, Springer Healthcare | Adis, vol. 22(4), pages 225-244.
    2. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Subhadip Chakrabarti & Sudipta Sarangi, 2010. "Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies," Working Papers 2010.117, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:12-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.