This paper examines AFDC participation and exit decisions in response to the recent changes in the welfare program. Different reform policies are identified separately and allowed to have varying impacts on current and potential recipients. Making use of the extended panel provided by the NLSY79, a monthly competing risks hazard model of eligibility and participation is estimated. Results show that while recipients are responsive to some provisions, the provisions retard rather than hasten exit. However, potential recipients are deterred from taking up benefits by the presence of time limits.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
00-05.
Length: Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nya:albaec:00-05
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A. Phone: (518) 442-4735 Fax: (518) 442-4736
Order Information: Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A. Email: Web: http://www.albany.edu/econ/dp/index.html
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Nadav Levy).
Related research
Keywords:
Find related papers by JEL classification: I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor