At a private-beliefs equilibrium of an n-person infinitely repeated game with discounting, each player maximizes his expected payoff relative to some private, possibly false, belief regarding the strategies chosen by his opponents. Moreover, the probability distribution induced over the observed play paths of the game according to his belie coincides with the one actually played. Thus, any statistical updating can only reinforce the beliefs. It is shown that if the game is played with perfect monitoring, then the joint behavior induced by a private-beliefs equilibrium coincides with a behavior induced by a Nash equilibrium even when perturbations are allowed.
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number
926.
Length: Date of creation: Jan 1991 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:926
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Paper
Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991.
"Private-Beliefs Equilibrium,"
Working Papers
91-19, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet, 1991.
"Absorbent Stable Sets,"
Discussion Papers
935, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]