Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 528.
Date of creation: Jun 1982
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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- FORGES, Françoise & MERTENS, Jean-François & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001.
"The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
- Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Forges, Françoise & Mertens, Jean-François & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5454, Paris Dauphine University.
- Dionysius Glycopantis & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Konrad Podczeck, 2009. "Symposium on: equilibria with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 217-219, February.
- Bel? Jerez, 2001.
"A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
494.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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