What money can't buy: allocations with priority lists, lotteries and queues
AbstractI study the welfare optimal allocation of a number of identical and indivisible objects to a set of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents under the hypothesis that money is not available. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum time that they are will- ing to wait in line to obtain a good. A priority list, which ranks agents according to their expected values, is optimal when hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing. Queues, which allocates the ob- ject to those who wait in line the longest, are optimal in a symmetric setting with decreasing hazard rates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1482.
Date of creation: Nov 2009
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
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