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Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types

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Author Info
Hongwei Gui
Rudolf M¨uller
Rakesh V. Vohra

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Abstract

This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1392.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1392.

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Date of creation: Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1392

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Keywords: Dominant Strategy Farkas Lemma Combinatorial Auctions.

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1244, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterjee & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000750, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Peters Hans & Vermeulen Dries, 2006. "WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions," Research Memoranda 021, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Mixed Bundling Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Mixed Bundling Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001123, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Mixed Bundling Auctions," Discussion Papers 141, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2007. "Mixed bundling auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 494-512, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Müller Rudolf & Uetz Marc & Vohra Rakesh & Heydenreich Birgit, 2007. "Characterization of Revenue Equivalence," Research Memoranda 017, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Heydenreich,Birgit & Müller,Rudolf & Uetz,Marc, 2005. "Mechanisms for Decentralized Online Scheduling," Research Memoranda 021, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  5. Müller,Rudolf & Perea,Andrés & Wolf,Sascha, 2005. "Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility," Research Memoranda 039, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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