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Cycling of Simple Rules in the Spatial Model

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Author Info
David Austen-Smith
Jeffrey S. Banks

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Abstract

McKelvey [4] proved that for strong simple preference aggregation rules applied to multidimensional sets of alternatives, the typical situation is that either the core is nonempty or the top-cycle set includes all available alternatives. But the requirement that the rule be strong excludes, inter alia, all supermajority rules. In this note, we show that McKelvey's theorem further implies that the typical situation for any simple rule is that either the core is nonempty or weak top-cycle set (equivalently, the core of the transitive closure of the rule) includes all available alternatives. Moreover, it is often the case that both of these statements obtain.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1246.

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Date of creation: Jul 1998
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1246

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Schofield, Norman, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Schofield, Norman, 1980. "Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 175-192, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Schofield, Norman, 1984. "Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 59-71, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Jeffrey S. Banks & John Duggan & Michel LeBreton, . "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
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  2. John Duggan & Jeffrey S. Banks, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Wallis Working Papers WP53, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kevin Roberts, 2007. "Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 383-404, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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