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Costly Information Acquisition

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Author Info
Matthew O. Jackson
James Peck

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Abstract

We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, a countable number of risk neutral traders and without noise traders. Prices can exhibit excess volatility (the variance of prices exceeds the variance of dividends), even in such a simple model. More generally, we show that for an open set of parameter values no equilibrium has prices which turn out to equal the value of dividends state by state, while for another open set of parameter values there exist equilibria such that equilibrium prices equal the value of dividends state by state. When information collection is endogenous and costly, expected prices exhibit a "V-shape" as a function of the cost of information: They are maximized when information is either costless so that everyone acquires it, or else is so costly that no one chooses to acquire it. Prices are depressed if information is cheap enough so that some agents become informed, while others do not. If the model is altered so that information is useful in making productive decisions, then the V-shape is altered, reducing the attractiveness of prohibitively high costs.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1087.

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Date of creation: Dec 1993
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1087

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hansen, Lars Peter & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1991. "Implications of Security Market Data for Models of Dynamic Economies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(2), pages 225-62, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Tirole, Jean, 1982. "On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1163-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-68, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Marsh, Terry A & Merton, Robert C, 1986. "Dividend Variability and Variance Bounds Tests for the Rationality ofStock Market Prices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 483-98, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Avraham Beja., 1977. "The Limits of Price Information in Market Processes," Research Program in Finance Working Papers 61, University of California at Berkeley.
  8. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. "Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1415-30, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kenneth D. West, 1988. "Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatility," NBER Working Papers 1833, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Azariadis, Costas, 1981. "Self-fulfilling prophecies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 380-396, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Peck, James & Shell, Karl, 1991. "Market Uncertainty: Correlated and Sunspot Equilibria in Imperfectly Competitive Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(5), pages 1011-29, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. LeRoy, Stephen F & Porter, Richard D, 1981. "The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 555-74, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," NBER Reprints 0121, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  16. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Equilibrium, Price Formation, and the Value of Private Information," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 1-16. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Grossman, Sanford J & Shiller, Robert J, 1981. "The Determinants of the Variability of Stock Market Prices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 222-27, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Shiller, Robert J, 1981. "Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 421-36, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. John Y. Campbell, Robert J. Shiller, 1988. "The Dividend-Price Ratio and Expectations of Future Dividends and Discount Factors," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(3), pages 195-228. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 1982. "Revelation of Information in Strategic Market Games: A Critique of Rational Expectations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 634R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Nov 1985. [Downloadable!]
  21. Kyle, Albert S, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(3), pages 317-55, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Cochrane, John H, 1992. "Explaining the Variance of Price-Dividend Ratios," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 243-80. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Jackson, Matthew & Peck, James, 1991. "Speculation and price fluctuations with private, extrinsic signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 274-295, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Matthew O. Jackson & James Peck, 1997. "Asymmetric Information in a Competitive Market Game: Reexamining the Implications of Rational Expectations," Microeconomics 9711004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1999. "Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions and Discontinuous Bayesian Games: Endogenous and Incentive Compatibility Sharing Rules," Working Papers 1075, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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