Contrary to the earlier findings under end-users piracy where the existence of strong network externality was shown to be a reason for allowing limited piracy, we find when the piracy is commercial in nature the optimal policy for the original software developer is to protect its product irrespective of the strength of network externality in the software users market.
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Paper provided by National University of Singapore, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number
wp0516.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
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