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Patent Licensing from High-Cost Firm to Low-Cost Firm

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Author Info

  • Sougata Poddar

    () (National University of Singapore)

  • Uday Bhanu Sinha

    () (Indian Statistical Institute)

Abstract

In the literature of patent licensing, most of the studies are done where new technology is transferred from a cost-efficient firm (patentee) to a less efficient firm (licensee). However, R&D intensive firms are usually based in high wage countries whereas the cost-efficient firms are based in low wage countries. As a result R&D intensive firms are not necessarily the most cost -efficient firms in the industry, although in most cases they are the patentee firms. Given this backdrop, we study a situation of patent licensing where the technology transfer takes place from an innovative firm, which is relatively inefficient in terms of cost of production to its cost-efficient rival. We look for optimal licensing arrangements in this environment. This framework also provides a platform to bridge the literature on external and internal patentees.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National University of Singapore, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number wp0503.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0503

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Related research

Keywords: licensing; fixed fee; royalty; two-part tariff; quantity competition; Innovation;

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  1. Choi, Jay Pil, 1996. "Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard," Economics Series 22, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  2. Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, 1990. "Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 147-160, Spring.
  3. Caves, Richard E & Crookell, Harold & Killing, J Peter, 1983. "The Imperfect Market for Technology Licenses," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 45(3), pages 249-67, August.
  4. Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354 Elsevier.
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  1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:3:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Arijit Mukherjee, . "Technology licensing under convex costs," Discussion Papers 10/05, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.

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