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The Role of Fixed Fee and Royalty in Patent Licensing

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Author Info
Sougata Poddar () (National University of Singapore)
Uday Bhanu Sinha () (Indian Statistical Institute)

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Abstract

We consider a monopolistic screening model of patent licensing. There is one patentee and one licensee and the patentee wishes to sell a patent of cost reducing technology to the licensee. The patentee is an outsider and the licensee is the only firm in the product market. The licensee possesses private information about the market demand which is unknown to the patentee except for some prior belief about it. In this scenario, we find the linear optimal licensing contract.

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Paper provided by National University of Singapore, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number wp0211.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0211

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Related research
Keywords: licensing fixed fee royalty adverse selection

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 1986. "Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-91, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, 2001. "Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 240-259, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, 1990. "Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 147-160, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Beggs, A. W., 1992. "The licensing of patents under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 171-191, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bousquet, Alain & Cremer, Helmuth & Ivaldi, Marc & Wolkowicz, Michel, 1998. "Risk sharing in licensing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 535-554, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Choi, Jay Pil, 2001. "Technology transfer with moral hazard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 249-266, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-89, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Martinez-Giralt, Xavier & David Perez-Castrillo, J., 1996. "The role of information in licensing contract design," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 43-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing under Asymmetric information," Industrial Organization 0211007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing under Asymmetric information," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/13, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sougata Poddar & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2002. "On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition," Departmental Working Papers wp0212, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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