This paper examines the welfare implications of an existence of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) in the GATT system, in the presence of cross-foreign ownership among countries. In particular, two GATT regimes are analyzed: a pure GATT regime without any regional free trade agreements, and modified GATT regime with either an FTA or a CU. This paper argues that, when foreign ownership exists significantly between the countries, no countries in the GATT have an incentive to form a regional trade agreement before they participate in multilateral tariff negotiations.
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Paper provided by National University of Singapore, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number
wp0112.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
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