This paper examines experimental evidence relating to herd behaviour in situations when subjects can learn from each other, and can delay their decision. Subject acted rationally, gaining from observational learning, despite penalties for delay. Cascades were ubiquitous and reverse-cascades occurred in which incorrect decisions made by early decision-makers produced herds on the incorrect choice. The major departure from rationality came when subjects realized they had chosen incorrectly despite following the majority view.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number
2000-w15.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)