Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility
AbstractIn a game where the players have non-additive beliefs, we explore the beliefs implicit in the equilibrium behaviour of the players. Under one interpretation, we can show that there are well-defined departures from common knowledge of the game among the players. Our argument revolves around a representation theorem which relates equilibrium under under non-additive beliefs to equilibrium actions of a set of types in a Bayesian game with a common prior. Among these types, the game is common p-belief, where the 'p' depends on the degree of uncertainty aversion. Only when the beliefs are additive is p=1.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 137.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1997
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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
Other versions of this item:
- Mukerji Sujoy & Shin Hyun Song, 2002. "Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-30, June.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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