Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility
AbstractIn a game where the players have non-additive beliefs, we explore the beliefs implicit in the equilibrium behaviour of the players. Under one interpretation, we can show that there are well-defined departures from common knowledge of the game among the players. Our argument revolves around a representation theorem which relates equilibrium under under non-additive beliefs to equilibrium actions of a set of types in a Bayesian game with a common prior. Among these types, the game is common p-belief, where the 'p' depends on the degree of uncertainty aversion. Only when the beliefs are additive is p=1.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 137.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1997
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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
Other versions of this item:
- Mukerji Sujoy & Shin Hyun Song, 2002. "Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-30, June.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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- Atsushi Kajii & Takashi Ui, 2005.
"Incomplete Information Games With Multiple Priors,"
The Japanese Economic Review,
Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 332-351.
- Kota Saito, 2010. "Preference for Randomization - Ambiguity Aversion and Inequality Aversion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000094, David K. Levine.
- Kaito Sato, 2011. "Preference for Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion," Discussion Papers 1524, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Roman Kozhan, 2011. "Non-additive anonymous games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 215-230, May.
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