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Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility

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Author Info

  • Mukerji, S.
  • Song Shin, H.

Abstract

In a game where the players have non-additive beliefs, we explore the beliefs implicit in the equilibrium behaviour of the players. Under one interpretation, we can show that there are well-defined departures from common knowledge of the game among the players. Our argument revolves around a representation theorem which relates equilibrium under under non-additive beliefs to equilibrium actions of a set of types in a Bayesian game with a common prior. Among these types, the game is common p-belief, where the 'p' depends on the degree of uncertainty aversion. Only when the beliefs are additive is p=1.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 137.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:137

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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

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Keywords: GAME THEORY;

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Cited by:
  1. Atsushi Kajii & Takashi Ui, 2004. "Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research 583, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Kota Saito, 2010. "Preference for Randomization - Ambiguity Aversion and Inequality Aversion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000094, David K. Levine.
  3. Roman Kozhan, 2011. "Non-additive anonymous games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 215-230, May.
  4. Kaito Sato, 2011. "Preference for Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1524, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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