This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Kevin Roberts () (Nuffield College, University of Oxford)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly. Intertemporal voting simplifies the strategic issues and the agenda setting is as unrestricted as possible. The possibility of cycles is examined, both in the intertemporal extension to the Condorcet paradox and in more general examples. The set of possibilities is rich, as is demonstrated by an exhaustive study of a three person, three state world. Equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist but a weakening of the equilibrium concept to admit probabilistic voting allows a general existence result to be proved. The analysis leads to the development of a dominant state which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2005/w15/condorcetcycles.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2005-W15.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0515

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Maxine Collett).

Related research
Keywords: Condorcet paradox; Condorcet winner; Condorcet winner; majority voting; intertemporal voting; strategic voting;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bernheim & Slavov, 2009. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 76(1), pages 33-62, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Inada, Ken-Ichi, 1969. "The Simple Majority Decision Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 490-506, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1999. "Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 663-672. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jeffrey Banks & John Duggan, 2001. "A Multidimensional Model of Repeated Elections," Wallis Working Papers WP24, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  5. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1984. "Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control," Working Papers 524, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by editing a NEP report.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.