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Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance

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Abstract

We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.

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File URL: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/%7Elizecon/RePEc/pdf/selfreg.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Industrial Economics Division in its series Occasional Papers with number 3.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: 07 Apr 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nub:occpap:3

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Keywords: industry self-regulation; voluntary compliance; game theory; public goods; collective action.;

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  1. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 678-89, May.
  2. Catherine J. Morrison-Paul & Donald S. Siegel, 2006. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Economic Performance," Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics 0605, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics.
  3. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1981. "The Self-Regulating Profession," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 217-34, April.
  4. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
  5. Bomsel, O. & Borkey, P. & Glachant, M. & Leveque, F., 1996. "Is there room for environmental self-regulation in the mining sector?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-2), pages 79-86.
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Cited by:
  1. Henry Adobor, 2012. "Ethical Issues in Outsourcing: The Case of Contract Medical Research and the Global Pharmaceutical Industry," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 239-255, January.
  2. Patrick Gonzalez, 2011. "Certification as a Rationale for Voluntary Agreements," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2011-2, CREATE.

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