Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance
AbstractWe analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Industrial Economics Division in its series Occasional Papers with number 3.
Date of creation: 07 Apr 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road, Nottingham, NG8 1BB
Phone: +44 (0) 115 84 66602
Fax: +44 (0) 115 84 66667
Web page: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/Divisions/EconomicsFinance/
More information through EDIRC
industry self-regulation; voluntary compliance; game theory; public goods; collective action.;
Other versions of this item:
- Simon Ashby & Swee-Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann, 2004. "Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 91-106.
- Simon Ashby & Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann, 2003. "Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance," Occasional Papers 2, Nottingham University Business School.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bomsel, O. & Borkey, P. & Glachant, M. & Leveque, F., 1996. "Is there room for environmental self-regulation in the mining sector?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-2), pages 79-86.
- Catherine J. Morrison-Paul & Donald S. Siegel, 2006.
"Corporate Social Responsibility and Economic Performance,"
Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics
0605, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics.
- Catherine M. Paul & Donald Siegel, 2006. "Corporate social responsibility and economic performance," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 207-211, December.
- Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 678-89, May.
- Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1981. "The Self-Regulating Profession," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 217-34, April.
- Henry Adobor, 2012. "Ethical Issues in Outsourcing: The Case of Contract Medical Research and the Global Pharmaceutical Industry," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 239-255, January.
- Gonzalez, Patrick, 2011.
"Certification as a Rationale for Voluntary Agreements,"
117827, University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE).
- Patrick Gonzalez, 2011. "Certification as a Rationale for Voluntary Agreements," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2011-2, CREATE.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Robert Hoffmann).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.