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Property taxation as incentive for cost control:Empirical evidence for utility services in Norway

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Author Info
Lars-Erik Borge () (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)
Jørn Rattsø () (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

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Abstract

Recent theoretical research suggests that property taxation has incentive effects that can help control cost problems in the public sector. The institutional setting in Norway allows this first empirical investigation of the incentive effect of property taxation, since we can separate between local governments with and without property tax. The raw data of the variation in the unit cost level for utilities show that local governments with property tax have about 20% lower unit cost. Using both linear regression and propensity score matching, we are not able to wash out the difference in unit costs. Our interpretation is that having a visible and controversial local tax related to property stimulates voter interest in local government activities and thereby may help cost control. The incentive effect is of interest for the design of fiscal federalism.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology in its series Working Paper Series with number 7606.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 19 Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:nst:samfok:7606

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Related research
Keywords: Property tax incentive effects public sector costs matching

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jørn Rattsø & Jon Hernes Fiva, 2005. "Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice," Working Paper Series 5305, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, revised 02 Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
  2. Boadway, Robin & Horiba, Isao & Jha, Raghbendra, 1999. " The Provision of Public Services by Government Funded Decentralized Agencies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 157-84, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jon H. Fiva and Marte Rønning, 2006. "The Incentive Effects of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norwegian School Districts," Discussion Papers 484, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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  5. Falch, Torberg & Rattso, Jorn, 1999. "Local public choice of school spending: disaggregating the demand function for educational services," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 361-373, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Lars-Erik Borge & Linn Renée Naper, 2006. "Efficiency Potential and Efficiency Variation in Norwegian Lower Secondary Schools," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(2), pages 221-249, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. James M. Poterba, 1996. "Demographic Structure and the Political Economy of Public Education," NBER Working Papers 5677, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Borge, Lars-Erik & Rattso, Jorn, 2003. "The Relationships Between Costs and User Charges: The Case of a Norwegian Utility Service," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  13. Borge, Lars-Erik & Rattso, J.Jorn, 2004. "Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 805-826, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Torsten Persson, 2001. "Currency unions and trade: how large is the treatment effect?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 433-462, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. James M. Poterba, 1995. "State Responses to Fiscal Crisis: The Effects of Budgetary Institutionsand Politics," NBER Working Papers 4375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Lars-Erik Borge & Jørn Rattsø, 2005. "The Relationships between Cost and User Charges: The Case of the Norwegian Utility Service," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 61(1), pages 98-, March.
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  22. Jorid Kalseth & Jørn Rattsø, 1998. "Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 63-83, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jon H. Fiva and Marte Rønning, 2006. "The Incentive Effects of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norwegian School Districts," Discussion Papers 484, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Borge, Lars-Erik & Rattso, Jorn, 2001. "Income Distribution and Tax Structure: Microeconomic Test of the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jørn Rattsø & Jon Hernes Fiva, 2005. "Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice," Working Paper Series 5305, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, revised 02 Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marte Rønning & Jon Hernes Fiva, 2004. "Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency," Working Paper Series 5105, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, revised 14 Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
  5. Borge, Lars-Erik & Rattso, Jorn, 2003. "The Relationships Between Costs and User Charges: The Case of a Norwegian Utility Service," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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