This paper compares union wage bargaining outcomes across different types of employers. Five different employer objectives are discussed; profit–, welfare– and output maximization, and two specifications of a Leviathan. The model shows that the ordering of the union wage level across employer types depends on the functional form of product demand. With constant elasticity of product demand, the wage tends to be lowest in the output maximization case, while with a linear product demand, the wage tends to be lowest under welfare maximization.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology in its series Working Paper Series with number
2402.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Joshua L. Schwarz, 1987.
"Public Sector Labor Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
1179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. & Schwarz, Joshua L., 1987.
"Public-sector labor markets,"
Handbook of Labor Economics,
in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1219-1260
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)