Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty

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Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty

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Walter Bossert
Hans Peters

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Walter Bossert

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Paper provided by University of Nottingham, School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 98/8.

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Handle: RePEc:not:notecp:98/8

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Article
- Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2001. "Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-10, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Andrea Gallice, 2007. "Some equivalence results between mixed strategy Nash equilibria and minimax regret in 2x2 games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(29), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
BOSSERT, Walter & DERKS, Jean & PETERS, Hans, 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bossert, W. & Derks, J. & Peters, H., 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Bossert,Walter & Derks,Jean & Peters,Hans, 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Research Memoranda 002, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
- Bossert, Walter & Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans, 2005. "Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 12-23, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Amparo M. Mármol Conde & Clara Ponsatí Obiols, 2006. "Bargaining Multiple Issues with Leximin Preferences," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/05, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]

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