Coalitional Games with Veto Players: Myopic and Rational Behavior
AbstractThis paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coali- tional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining play-ers must accept or reject. We present a model where the proposer can make sequential proposals over n periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are rational, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players must respond to the proposal after weaker ones.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2012-11.
Date of creation: Nov 2012
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
veto players; noncooperative bargaining; myopic behavior; serial rule;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-09-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-09-09 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-09 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules,"
Staff General Research Papers
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