Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox
AbstractIt is well known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that, if parties di¤er in voting weight, it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better-o¤ as a result. This can happen even if the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. Even though actually being the proposer is valuable, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2010-19.
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
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legislative bargaining; weighted majority games; voting paradoxes;
Other versions of this item:
- Maria Montero, 2010. "Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox," Discussion Papers 2010-19, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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