Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance
AbstractWe analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Nottingham University Business School in its series Occasional Papers with number 2.
Date of creation: 07 Apr 2003
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Simon Ashby & Swee-Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann, 2004. "Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 91-106.
- Simon Ashby & Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann, 2003. "Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance," Occasional Papers 3, Industrial Economics Division.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2003-08-24 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2003-08-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2003-09-08 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-PBE-2003-08-24 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2003-08-24 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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