We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.
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Paper provided by Nottingham University Business School in its series Occasional Papers with number
2.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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