This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Causes of Excessive Deficits in the European Union

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Vítor Castro () (Universidade do Minho - NIPE)
Abstract

Several studies have identified the factors that cause public deficits in industrial democracies. They consider that economic, political and institutional factors play an important role in the understanding of those deficits. However, the study of the determinants of excessive deficits remains practically unexplored. Since excessive deficits can have large negative spillover effects when countries are forming a monetary union without a centralised budget – as it is the case for a group of European countries – this paper tries to explore that gap in the literature by identifying the main causes of excessive deficits and the ways of avoiding them. Binary choice models are estimated over a panel of 15 European Union countries for the period 1970-2006, where an excessive deficit is defined as a deficit higher than 3% of GDP. Results show that a weak fiscal stance, low economic growth, the timing of parliamentary elections and majority left-wing governments are the main causes of excessive deficits in the EU countries. Moreover, the institutional constraints imposed after Maastricht over the EU countries’ fiscal policy have succeeded in reducing the probability of excessive deficits in Europe, especially in small countries. Therefore, this study concludes that supranational fiscal constraints, national efforts to reduce public debts, growth promoting policies and mechanisms to avoid political opportunism and partisan effects are essential factors for an EU country to avoid excessive deficits. Finally, the results presented in this paper raise the idea that a good strategy for the EU countries to avoid excessive deficits caused by the opportunistic behaviour of their policymakers would be to schedule elections for the beginning or the end of the year.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2007/NIPE_WP_13_2007.PDF
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by NIPE - Universidade do Minho in its series NIPE Working Papers with number 13/2007.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:13/2007

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas, Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, P-4710-057 Braga, Portugal
Phone: +351-253604510 ext 5532
Fax: +351-253601380
Email:
Web page: http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/versao_inglesa/index_uk.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Maria João Thompson).

Related research
Keywords: Excessive public deficits European Union Political opportunism Binary choice models

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
O52 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-12.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.