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Does the NIMBY strategy really promote a self-interest?: Evidence from England's waste management policy

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  • Masashi Yamamoto

    (Center for Far Eastern Studies, University of Toyama)

  • Yuichiro Yoshida

    (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

Abstract

NIMBY (not in my backyard) is the word used to describe the human behavior whereby a person agrees on an issue but refuses to accept it when it happens ‘in his own back yard’. This paper analyzes this type of NIMBY activity and, using evidence from England’s waste management policy, determines that NIMBY decisions are not necessarily the result of personal self-interest. If people disagree with building a nuisance facility, such as a site for waste and recyclables, in their own backyard, the result is an increase in illegal dumping rather than the legal and proper disposal of waste materials at an official facility. Using the spatial econometrics approach, we further provide evidence that the broken window theory is also applicable to illegal dumping.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in its series GRIPS Discussion Papers with number 12-13.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ngi:dpaper:12-13

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  1. Ichinose, Daisuke & Yamamoto, Masashi, 2011. "On the relationship between the provision of waste management service and illegal dumping," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 79-93, January.
  2. Don Fullerton & Thomas C. Kinnaman, 1993. "Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping," NBER Working Papers 4374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Hilary Sigman, 1998. "Midnight Dumping: Public Policies and Illegal Disposal of Used Oil," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 157-178, Spring.
  4. Abbott, Andrew & Nandeibam, Shasikanta & O'Shea, Lucy, 2011. "Explaining the variation in household recycling rates across the UK," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(11), pages 2214-2223, September.
  5. Arik Levinson, 1999. "State Taxes and Interstate Hazardous Waste Shipments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 666-677, June.
  6. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Per G. Fredriksson, 2010. "Regulatory Environmental Federalism," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 319-339, October.
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