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Multi-agent Route Choice Game for Transportation Engineering

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Author Info

  • Xuan Di
  • Henry Liu
  • David Levinson

    ()
    (Nexus (Networks, Economics, and Urban Systems) Research Group, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Minnesota)

Abstract

In undergraduate transportation engineering courses, traffic assignment is a difficult concept for both instructors to teach and for students to learn, because it involves many mathematical derivations and computations. We have designed a multiplayer game to engage students in the process of learning route choice, so that students can visualize how the traffic gradually reach user equilibrium (UE). For one scenario, we employ a Braess' Paradox, and explore the phenomenon during the game-play. We have done the case-control and before-after comparisons. The statistical results show that, students who played the game improve their understanding of the Braess' Paradox more than those who did not play. Among game players, younger students benefit more in their learning; while those who are not comfortable with exploring a phenomenon on their own think this game not as effective as those who prefer hands-on learning experiences.

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File URL: http://nexus.umn.edu/Papers/MARC-Game.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group in its series Working Papers with number 000100.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Publication status: Published in working paper
Handle: RePEc:nex:wpaper:marc-game

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Related research

Keywords: route choice; traffic assignment; user equilibrium; equilibration; education; Braess' Paradox;

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