Optimal Design of Two-Sided Market Platforms: An Empirical Case Study of eBay
AbstractWhile much is known about optimal design of auctions within the context of a single item for sale, little is known about optimal design of large platform markets like eBay and auto auction houses that house large numbers of concurrent auctions. We attempt a macro-level empirical market design exercise by combining a unique dataset on tablet sales collected from eBay over the course of a year with methodologies developed by Bodoh-Creed (2011) and Backus and Lewis (2013). The former proposes a tractable approach to studying dynamic auction markets when the number of participants on both sides is sufficiently large. The model also delivers predictions on optimal fee schedule design -- specifically, in terms of listing fees and percentage charges for a sale -- for an auction house wishing to maximize profits by attracting the appropriate mix of buyers and sellers into the market. We begin by empirically investigating the key assumptions of the model which deliver (computational and empirical) tractability, and find that they are reasonable. We then estimate consumer demand, market supply, and the distributions of market entrants (this part still in progress). These figures are plugged into the Bodoh-Creed (2011) framework in order to compute optimal fee schedules and draw comparisons to actual fee schedules, as well as to make policy prescriptions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 13-22.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
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Web page: http://www.NETinst.org/
Online Auctions; eBay; Market Design; Large Markets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-10-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2013-10-18 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MKT-2013-10-18 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2013-10-18 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2001.
"Internet Auctions with Many Traders,"
peters-01-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-05-03-30-03-06-03, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Jan 2006.
- Peters,M. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Internet auctions with many traders," Working papers 11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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