Migration Between Platforms
AbstractWe develop a model of dynamic platform formation under positive platform externalities. Users can switch between an incumbent and entrant platforms, switching opportunities arise stochastically and users can choose whether to accept or reject an opportunity to switch. For homogeneous users, we characterize the incumbency advantage implied by a given equilibrium realization of the switching process. For linear utility, incumbency advantage increases in the mean and dispersion of the incumbentâ€™s share during the switching process, which captures the momentum and coordination of the process. Heterogeneity in preferences may lead some users to delay their switching or never switch at all. Assuming that switching opportunities arrive according to a Poisson process, users switch to the entrant platform if the average preference favors the entrant and if preferences are not too polarized.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 13-18.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
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platform Formation; Migration; Standardization and Compatibility; Industry Dynamics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-10-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2013-10-18 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2013-10-18 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2013-10-18 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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