Identity, Community and Segregation
AbstractI develop a framework to explain why identity divides some communities and not others. An identity group is defined as a group of individuals with the same `culture'. A community is divided when different identities are socially segregated; a community is integrated when there is no social segregation between different identities. I find three possible outcomes for a community: assimilation, where groups socially integrate and one group conforms to the culture of another; non-assimilative integration, where groups integrate but individuals retain their own identity; and segregation, where groups socially segregate and retain their own culture. I find that certain community environments encourage segregation: (i) communities with similar sized identity groups; (ii) larger communities; (iii) communities with greater cultural distance between identities. Further, when segregation occurs, the cultural divide between the two groups can increase endogenously beyond ex-ante differences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 10-10.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
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identity; culture; segregation; immigration; immigrants; networks; network formation; coordination; stochastic stability.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2010-10-16 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2010-10-16 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-MIG-2010-10-16 (Economics of Human Migration)
- NEP-NET-2010-10-16 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-10-16 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2010-10-16 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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