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Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives

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Author Info
Jay Pil Choi () (Department of Economics, Michigan State University)
Byung-Cheol Kim () (School of Economics, Georgia Institute of Technology)

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. We show that the ISP's decision on the introduction of discrimination across content depends on a potential trade-off between network access fee and the revenue from the trade of the first-priority. Concerning the ISP's investment incentives, we find that capacity expansion affects the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. Because the relative merit of the first priority, and thus its value, becomes relatively small for higher capacity levels, the ISP's incentive to invest on capacity under a discriminatory network can be smaller than that under a neutral regime where such rent extraction effects do not exist. Contrary to ISPs' claims that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling effect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite. Classification-JEL: D4, L12, L4, L43, L51, L52

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 08-03.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision: Sep 2008
Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0803

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Web page: http://www.NETinst.org/

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Related research
Keywords: Net Neutrality; Investment (Innovation) Incentives; Queuing Theory; Hold-up Problem; Two-sided Markets; Vertical Integration;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, 1996. "Damaged Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 149-174, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email: rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.
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  3. Jay Pil Choi, 2007. "Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Mark Armstrong Author-Email: mark.armstrong@ucl.ac.uk, 2006. "Competition in Two-Sided Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 668-691, Autumn.
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  5. Choi, Jay Pil, 1995. "Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the 'Most Favored Nation' clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 143-160, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. " Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-28, Summer.
  7. Viktória Kocsis & Paul Bijl, 2007. "Network neutrality and the nature of competition between network operators," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 159-184, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Tommaso M. Valletti & Carlo Cambini, 2005. "Investments and Network Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 446-468, Summer.
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  9. Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael L., 2007. "The economics of product-line restrictions with an application to the network neutrality debate," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 215-248, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jong-Hee Hahn, 2006. "Damaged Durable Goods," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 121-133, Spring.
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  11. Edelson, Noel M & Hildebrand, David K, 1975. "Congestion Tolls for Poisson Queuing Processes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(1), pages 81-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Nicholas Economides & Joacim Tåg, 2007. "Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis," Working Papers 07-14, NET Institute, revised Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Naor, P, 1969. "The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 15-24, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Nicholas Economides, 2007. ""Net Neutrality," Non-Discrimination and Digital Distribution of Content Through the Internet," Working Papers 07-9, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Krämer, Jan & Wiewiorra, Lukas, 2009. "Innovation through Discrimination!? A Formal Analysis of the Net Neutrality Debate," MPRA Paper 16655, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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