AbstractIn Cournot's model of complements, the producers of A and B are both monopolists. This paper extends Cournot's model to allow for competition between complements on one side of the market. Consider two complements, A and B, where the A+B bundle is valuable only when purchased together. Good A is supplied by a monopolist(e.g., Microsoft) and there is competition in the B goods from vertically differentiated suppliers (e.g., Intel and AMD). In this simple game, there may not be a pure-strategy equilibria. In the standard case where marginal costs are weakly positive, there is no pure strategy where the lower quality B firm obtains positive market share. We also consider the case where A has negative marginal costs, as would arise when A can expect to make upgrade sales to an installed base. When profits from the installed base are sufficiently large, a pure strategy equilibrium exists with two B firms active in the market. Although there is competition in the complement market, the monopoly Firm A may earn lower profits in this environment. Consequently, A may prefer to accept lower future profits in order to interact with a monopolist complement in B.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 07-44.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision: Nov 2007
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AMD; complementors; complements; co-opetition; equilibrium non-existence; installed base; Intel; Microsoft; pricing.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-11-24 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-11-24 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2007-11-24 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2007-11-24 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2007-11-24 (Microeconomics)
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