Strategic Product Pre-announcements in Markets with Network Effects
AbstractIt is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers’ purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products’ installed bases. However, such announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns. We analyze the effects of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms are allowed to strategically make false announcements. We also discuss their implications for consumer welfare and anti-trust policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 05-09.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2005
Date of revision: Sep 2005
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-08-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-08-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2006-08-26 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2006-08-26 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Heiko A. Gerlach, 2004. "Announcement, Entry, and Preemption When Consumers Have Switching Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 184-202, Spring.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
- Sobel, Joel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 557-73, October.
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