Advanced Search

Papers Articles Authors Institutions Data (FRED®)

Abstract

We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of firms changes as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated firms, owners (managers) have to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial overload, and discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates the managerial overload, but creates a holdup problem, causing some of the rents of the owners to be dissipated to the supplier. Far from the technology frontier, imitation activities are more important, and vertical integration is preferred. Closer to the frontier, the value of innovation increases, encouraging outsourcing.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17787/1/17787.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University College London in its series Open Access publications from University College London with number http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17787/.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of the European Economic Association (2003) v.1, p.543-553
Handle: RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17787/

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.ucl.ac.uk

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
• O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

1. Acemoglu, D. & Aghion, P. & Zilibotti, F., 2006. "Distance to frontier, selection, and economic growth," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
   
   • Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2006. "Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 37-74, 03.
   • Zilibotti, Fabrizio & Aghion, Philippe & Acemoglu, Daron, 2006. "Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth," Scholarly Articles 4554122, Harvard University Department of Economics.
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Aghion, Philippe & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2002. "Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2002. "Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 9066, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
2. Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. " Information Accumulation in Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-38, March.
   
   • Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1998. "Information Accumulation in Development," Papers 652, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1998. "Information Accumulation in Development," Seminar Papers 652, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
3. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   
   • Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
   • Aghion, P. & Tirole, J., 1997. "Formal and real authority in organizations," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
   • Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
   • Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
4. Martimort, D. & Verdier, T., 1999. "Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth," DELTA Working Papers 1999-09, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
   
   • Martimort, D. & Verdier, T., 1999. "Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth," Papers 1999-09, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
   • Martimort, David & Verdier, Thierry, 2001. "Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 2700, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
5. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   
   • Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
   • Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
6. Patrick Francois & Joanne Roberts, 2003. "Contracting Productivity Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 59-85.
   
   • Patrick Francois & Joanne Roberts, 2003. "Contracting Productivity Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 59-85, January.
   • Patrick Francois & Joanne Roberts, 2000. "Contracting Productivity Growth," Working Papers jorob-99-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
   • Francois, P. & Roberts, J., 2001. "Contracting Productivity Growth," Discussion Paper 2001-35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
7. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Integration Versus Outsourcing In Industry Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 85-120, February.

Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17787/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kieron Jones).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

---

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.

Privacy Legal