Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Testing for asymmetric employer learning

Contents:

Author Info

  • Schönberg, U.

Abstract

Recent evidence suggests that employers acquire more precise information about a worker’s productivity the more time he or she spends in the labor market. The following question arises: Is learning symmetric, that is, do all employers have the same information about workers’ productivity, or is learning asymmetric, that is, does the current employer have superior information about workers’ productivity? This article develops a learning model with endogenous mobility that nests both learning hypotheses. It then proposes new tests for asymmetric employer learning. Overall, learning appears to be mostly symmetric, except possibly when the employees involved are college graduates.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17153/1/17153.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University College London in its series Open Access publications from University College London with number http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17153/.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Labor Economics (2007-10) v.25, p.651-692
Handle: RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17153/

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.ucl.ac.uk

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. David Card & Ana Rute Cardoso, 2012. "Can Compulsory Military Service Raise Civilian Wages? Evidence from the Peacetime Draft in Portugal," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 57-93, October.
  2. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments in Market Equilibrium," Working Papers 1193, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  3. Bognanno, Michael L. & Melero Martín, Eduardo, 2012. "Promotion Signals, Age and Education," IZA Discussion Papers 6431, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2007. "Information and Human Capital Management," Economics Series Working Papers 367, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence," MPRA Paper 1550, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Anne Bucher & Sébastien Ménard, 2010. "Employment Protection Legislation and Adverse Selection at the Labor Market Entry," Working Papers halshs-00812099, HAL.
  7. David Card & Ana Rute Cardoso, 2011. "Can Compulsory Military Service Increase Civilian Wages? Evidence from the Peacetime Draft in Portugal," NBER Working Papers 17694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Joseph G. Altonji & Anthony Smith & Ivan Vidangos, 2009. "Modeling Earnings Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 14743, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Joshua C. Pinkston, 2006. "A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning With Testable Implications," Working Papers 390, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  10. Dustmann, C. & Schonberg, U., 2009. "Training and Union wages," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
  11. Valerie Smeets & Michael Waldman & Frederic Warzynski, 2013. "Performance, Career Dynamics, and Span of Control," Economics Working Papers 2013-02, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  12. Ben Kriechel & Samuel Muehlemann & Harald Pfeifer & Miriam Schuette, 2011. "Works councils, collective bargaining and apprenticeship training," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0057, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  13. Kazuaki Okamura, 2011. "The Signalling Role of Promotion in Japan," Discussion Papers 1112, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
  14. Seth M. Freedman & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2011. "Learning by Doing with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Prosper.com," NBER Working Papers 16855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Feng, Shuaizhang & Zheng, Bingyong, 2010. "Imperfect Information, On-the-Job Training, and the Employer Size-Wage Puzzle: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 4998, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17153/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kieron Jones).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.