Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Markov bargaining games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cripps, M.W.
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    I consider an alternating offer bargaining game which is played by a risk neutral buyer and seller, where the value of the good to be traded follows a Markov process. For these games the existence of a perfect equilibrium is proved and the set of equilibrium payoffs and strategies are characterised. The main results are (a) if the buyer is less patient than the seller, then there will be delays in the players reaching an agreement, the buyer is forced into a suboptimal consumption policy and the equilibrium is ex-ante inefficient, and (b) if the buyer is more patient than the seller, then there is a unique and efficient equilibrium where agreement is immediate.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/16384/1/16384.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University College London in its series Open Access publications from University College London with number http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/16384/.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Mar 1998
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (1998-03) v.22, p.341-355
    Handle: RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/16384/

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.ucl.ac.uk

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Ali, S. Nageeb M., 2006. "Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 109-137, September.
    2. Coles, Melvyn G. & Muthoo, Abhinay, 2003. "Bargaining in a non-stationary environment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 70-89, March.
    3. Melvyn G. Coles & Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "Bargaining equilibrium in a non-stationary environment," Economics Discussion Papers 505, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    4. Thanassoulis, John, 2010. "Optimal stalling when bargaining," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 101-120, February.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/16384/

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kieron Jones).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.