Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post
Abstract
A postal regulator typically faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult and which complicate the process of liberalizing the industry. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of fixed costs, require retail prices to depart from the underlying marginal costs of the incumbent provider. Second, competing firms may be able to bypass the incumbent’s delivery network. Within a simple and stylized framework, this note analyzes how access charges should best be set in the light of these twin constraints.Download Info
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Paper provided by University College London in its series Open Access publications from University College London with number http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/14556/.Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Review of Network Economics (2008-06) v.7, p.172-187
Handle: RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/14556/
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Web page: http://www.ucl.ac.uk
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Mark Armstrong, 2008. "Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post," MPRA Paper 62, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- L87 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Postal and Delivery Services
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509.
- De Donder, Philippe, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector," IDEI Working Papers 319, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996.
"The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-50, June.
- Armstrong, M. & Doyle, C. & Vickers, J., 1995. "The access pricing problem: a synthesis," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9532, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Mark Armstrong, 2001. "Access Pricing, Bypass, and Universal Service," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 297-301, May.
- Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Dudley, Paul & Rodriguez, Frank, 2010.
"Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market,"
TSE Working Papers
10-148, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Philippe De Donder & Helmuth Cremer & Paul Dudley & Frank Rodriguez, 2011. "Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 4.
- Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Dudley, Paul & Rodriguez, Frank, 2010. "Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market," IDEI Working Papers 601, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Dudley, Paul & Rodriguez, Frank, 2011. "Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Dudley, Paul & Rodriguez, Frank, 2006.
"Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures,"
IDEI Working Papers
407, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Phillippe De Donder & Helmuth Cremer & Paul Dudley & Frank Rodriguez, 2008. "Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 5.
- Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Dudley, Paul & Rodriguez, Frank, 2008. "Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
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