On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates
AbstractWe study and compare equilibrium platforms in models of one-dimensional electoral competition with two and four policy-motivated parties. We first analyse the plurality game, where the party that gets the most votes is elected and implements its proposed platform. Restrictions on the set of credible announcements are needed to get existence of equilibria. Comparing equilibria with two and four parties, we obtain that moderate parties react to the introduction of extreme parties by proposing the same or more extreme equilibrium platforms. We then study the proportional system, where the policy implemented is a weighted sum of the proposals, with the voting shares as weights. Here, the existence of extreme parties leads moderate ones to choose more centrist platforms.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toulouse 1 Capitole in its series Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole with number http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/716/.
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare (2005-10) v.25, p.1-29
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.univ-tlse1.fr/
Other versions of this item:
- Georges Casamatta & Philippe Donder, 2005. "On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 1-29, October.
- Casamatta, Georges & De Donder, Philippe, 2003. "On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," IDEI Working Papers 161, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Casamatta, Georges & De Donder, Philippe, 2003. "On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," CEPR Discussion Papers 3885, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin J. Osborne, 1992.
"Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
1992-02, McMaster University.
- Osborne Martin J., 1993. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January.
- Ortuño, Ignacio, 1997. "A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/5498, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Ignacio OrtuÓo-OrtÎn, 1997. "A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 427-438.
- Enriqueta Aragonés & Andrew Postlewaite, 2000. "Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation," Economics Working Papers 525, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Palfrey, Thomas R, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 139-56, January.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Alejandro Saporiti & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2011.
"Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence,"
The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
1119, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Alejandro Saporiti & Nicolaas J Vriend, 2011. "Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 11-15, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Alejandro Saporiti & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2011. "Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 682, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Machado, Fabiana, 2011. "Inequality, Uncertainty, and Redistribution," MPRA Paper 35665, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Selim Ergun, 2008. "Centrist's Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints," ThE Papers 08/06, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:31:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Raphaël Soubeyran, 2006. "When Inertia Generates Political Cycles," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(31), pages 1-8.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Main contact person).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.