Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures
AbstractPostal regulators set price controls in order to simultaneously ensure the provision of the universal service, promote competition and equity. We study the associated price control procedures in a model where the universal service provider offers both a single piece product and a business mail product and where entrants offer a bulk mail product. Our results from the numerical calibration of our model indicate that in the case where entry is confined only to access, a range of procedures appear capable of meeting these objectives. However, if bypass is available these trade offs become more costly.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toulouse 1 Capitole in its series Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole with number http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/669/.
Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Publication status: Published in The Review of Network Economics (2008-06) v.7, p.247-271
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Other versions of this item:
- De Donder Phillippe & Cremer Helmuth & Dudley Paul & Rodriguez Frank, 2008. "Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-25, June.
- Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Dudley, Paul & Rodriguez, Frank, 2006. "Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures," IDEI Working Papers 407, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Armstrong, Mark, 2006.
"Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post,"
62, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Armstrong Mark, 2008. "Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-16, June.
- Armstrong, M., 2008. "Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
- Philippe Donder, 2006.
"Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations,"
Review of Industrial Organization,
Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 307-326, 05.
- De Donder, Philippe, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-56, November.
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