Advanced Search

Papers Articles Authors Institutions Data (FRED®)

Abstract

This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game. It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always decrease rent-seeking efforts. These conditions hold for any regular contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also prudent. Under n = 2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared to risk-neutrality. An intuition for this result is given based on a self-protection model.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2866/1/09.05.281.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Toulouse 1 Capitole in its series Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole with number http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2866/.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Public Choice (2010-12) v.145, p.339-349
Handle: RePEc:ner:toulou:http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2866/

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.univ-tlse1.fr/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2011-12-13 (All new papers)
• NEP-GTH-2011-12-13 (Game Theory)
• NEP-UPT-2011-12-13 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

1. Wärneryd, Karl, 2000. "Information in Conflicts," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 388, Stockholm School of Economics.
   
   • Warneryd, Karl, 2003. "Information in conflicts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 121-136, May.
   • Wärneryd, Karl, 2001. "Information in conflicts," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-11, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
2. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2012. "Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 247-275, October.
   
   • Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2008. "Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0806, Economics, The University of Manchester.
3. Péter Esö & Lucy White, 2004. "Precautionary Bidding in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 77-92, 01.
   
   • Peter Eso & Lucy White, 2001. "Precautionary Bidding in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1331, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Esö, Péter & White, Lucy, 2003. "Precautionary Bidding in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
4. Jullien, B. & Salanie, B. & Salanie, F., 1998. "Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort?," Papers 98.489, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
   
   • Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 1999. "Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort?," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 24(1), pages 19-28, June.
   • Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard & Salanié, François, 1999. "Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort ?," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
   • Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 1998. "Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort," Working Papers 98-12, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
5. Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521804127.
6. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Tullock And Hirshleifer: A Meeting Of The Minds," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-13, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   
   • José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 101-124, September.
7. Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-10, March.
8. Kaïs Dachraoui & Georges Dionne & Louis Eeckhoudt & Philippe Godfroid, 2004. "Comparative Mixed Risk Aversion: Definition and Application to Self-Protection and Willingness to Pay," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 261-276, December.
9. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
10. Bramoullé, Yann & Treich, Nicolas, 2009. "Can Uncertainty Alleviate the Commons Problem?," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
    
    • Yann Bramoullé & Nicolas Treich, 2009. "Can Uncertainty Alleviate the Commons Problem?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(5), pages 1042-1067, 09.
11. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. " A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-50, April.
12. Louis Eeckhoudt & Christian Gollier, 2005. "The impact of prudence on optimal prevention," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 989-994, November.
13. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
14. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Comparing Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 441-59, June.
15. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
    
    • Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
16. Skaperdas, Stergios & Gan, Li, 1995. "Risk Aversion in Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(431), pages 951-62, July.
17. Dachraoui, K. & Dionne, G. & Eeckhoudt, L. & Godfroid, P., 2000. "Comparative Mixed Risk Aversion," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 00-10, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
18. Malueg, David A. & Yates, Andrew J., 2005. "Equilibria and comparative statics in two-player contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 738-752, September.
19. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2003. " Risk Aversion, Heterogeneity and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 1-25, October.
20. Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521009171.
21. Konrad, Kai A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1997. "Risk Aversion in Rent-Seeking and Rent-Augmenting Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1671-83, November.

Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Cited by:

1. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta & Andrew Yates, 2012. "Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum," Working Papers 12-30, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
   
   • Mago, Shakun & Sheremeta, Roman & Yates, Andrew, 2012. "Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum," MPRA Paper 43031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
2. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2012. "Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 247-275, October.
   
   • Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2008. "Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0806, Economics, The University of Manchester.
3. Murray, Cameron K., 2012. "Markets in political influence: rent-seeking, networks and groups," MPRA Paper 42070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
4. Noussair, C.N. & Trautmann, S.T. & Kuilen, G. van de, 2011. "Higher Order Risk Attitudes, Demographics, and Financial Decisions," Discussion Paper 2011-055, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ner:toulou:http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2866/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Main contact person).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

---

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.

Privacy Legal