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Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: a Theoretical Approach

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  • Guasch, Jose Luis
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Straub, Stéphane

Abstract

We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. Copyright Springer 2006

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Toulouse 1 Capitole in its series Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole with number http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2067/.

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Date of creation: Sep 2006
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Publication status: Published in Review of Industrial Organization (2006-09) v.29, p.55-73
Handle: RePEc:ner:toulou:http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2067/

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Web page: http://www.univ-tlse1.fr/

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  1. J. Luis Guasch & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Stephane Straub, 2004. "Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America," ESE Discussion Papers 103, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  2. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. Guasch, Jose Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stéphane, 2005. "Concessions of Infrastructure in Latin America: Goverment-Led Renegotiation," IDEI Working Papers 372, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Stigler, George J, 1970. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 526-36, May-June.
  7. Mathias Dewatripont & Philippe Aghion & Patrick Rey, 1994. "Renegotiation design with unverifiable information," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9591, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  8. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Incentives and Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199248681.
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