Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: a Theoretical Approach
AbstractWe construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. Copyright Springer 2006
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toulouse 1 Capitole in its series Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole with number http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2067/.
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Review of Industrial Organization (2006-09) v.29, p.55-73
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Web page: http://www.univ-tlse1.fr/
Other versions of this item:
- J. Guasch & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Stéphane Straub, 2006. "Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 55-73, September.
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- O54 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Latin America; Caribbean
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