Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report
AbstractI describe a model of entry with endogenous product-type choices. These choices are formalized as the outcomes of a game of incomplete information in which rivals' differentiated products have nonuniform competitive effects on profits. I estimate the model for location choices in the video retail industry using a nested fixed-point algorithm solution. The results imply significant returns to product differentiation. Simulations illustrate the trade off between demand and intensified competition and the extent to which markets with more scope for differentiation support greater entry.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toulouse 1 Capitole in its series Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole with number http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/191/.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in The RAND Journal of Economics (2006) v.35, p.645-667
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Web page: http://www.univ-tlse1.fr/
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- Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email:firstname.lastname@example.org Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: email@example.com Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.
- Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Two‐sided markets: a progress report," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, 09.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
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