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Monotonic allocation schemes in clan games

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  • Voorneveld, M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Grahn, S.

Abstract

Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions.This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic allocation scheme, where the value of each coalition is divided over its members in such a way that the clan members receive a higher, and the non-clan members a lower share as the coalitions grow larger.Each core element of a total clan game can be extended to both a population monotonic and a bi-monotonic allocation scheme.In total clan games where the clan consists of a single member (the so-called big boss) the use of the nucleolus as an allocation mechanism gives rise to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91573.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Publication status: Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (2003) v.56, p.439-449
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91573

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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Cited by:
  1. Brânzei, R. & Scotti, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Torre, A., 2002. "Discretization of Information Collecting Situations and Continuity of Compensation Rules," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2002-18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. José M. Jiménez Gómez & Josep Enric Peris Ferrando, 2012. "A proportional approach to bankruptcy. Problems with a guaranteed minimum," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2012-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  3. Rodica Branzei & Dinko Dimitrov & Stef Tijs, 2006. "Convex games versus clan games," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 381, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  4. Timmer, J.B., 2001. "Cooperative Behaviour, Uncertainty and Operations Research," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86973, Tilburg University.
  5. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Muto, S. & Ishihara, S. & Fukuda, E., 2002. "Fuzzy Clan Games and Bi-monotonic Allocation Rules," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2002-115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. William Thomson, 2013. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update," RCER Working Papers 578, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  7. Rodica Branzei & Dinko Dimitrov & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Convex games, clan games, and their marginal games," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 368, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  8. Stefano Moretti & Henk Norde & Kim Pham Do & Stef Tijs, 2002. "Connection problems in mountains and monotonic allocation schemes," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 83-99, June.
  9. Brânzei, R. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H., 2003. "Type Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Multi-Glove Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2003-34, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. Tijs, S.H. & Moretti, S. & Brânzei, R. & Norde, H.W., 2005. "The Bird Core for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree problems Revisited: Monotonicity and Additivity Aspects," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2005-3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Alparslan-Gok, S.Z. & Brânzei, R. & Tijs, S.H., 2008. "Big Boss Interval Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2008-47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Jesus Fco. Getan Olivan & Jesus Montes & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2006. "On the monotonic core," Working Papers in Economics, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia 155, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  13. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar, 2003. "Regular Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes and the Core," Working Papers in Economics, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia 110, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  14. Moretti, Stefano, 2008. "Cost Allocation Problems Arising from Connection Situations in an Interactive Cooperative Setting," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/4874, Paris Dauphine University.

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