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Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games

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Author Info

  • Brânzei, R.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Fragnelli, V.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

A class of cooperative games is introduced which arises from situations in which a set of agents is hierarchically structured and where potential individual economic abilities interfere with the behavioristic rules induced by the organization structure.These games form a cone generated by a specific class of unanimity games, namely those based on coalitions called peer groups. Different economic situations like auctions, communication situations, sequencing situations and flow situations are related to peer group games.For peer group games classical solution concepts have nice properties.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91321.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Publication status: Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (2002) v.55, p.93-106
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91321

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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  1. Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 1994. "The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games," Discussion Paper 1994-40, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Pradeep Dubey & Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Zemel, 1980. "On Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow," Discussion Papers 413, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Gilles, R.P. & Owen, G. & Brink, J.R. van den, 1991. "Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach," Discussion Paper 1991-14, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Borm, P.E.M. & Nouweland, C.G.A.M. van den & Tijs, S.H., 1994. "Cooperation and communication restrictions: A survey," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154189, Tilburg University.
  6. Derks, Jean & Haller, Hans & Peters, Hans, 2000. "The selectope for cooperative games," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12221, Maastricht University.
  7. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers 363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Cited by:
  1. René Brink, 2008. "Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 225-243, February.
  2. Rene van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2012. "Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-126/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. René van den Brink, 2004. "Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-127/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 447-460, 09.
  5. Brink J.R. van den & Talman A.J.J. & Herings P.J.J. & Laan G. van der, 2013. "The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht : GSBE, Graduate School of Business and Economics.
  6. René van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2004. "Harsanyi Power Solutions for Graph-restricted Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-095/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Algaba, A. & Bilbao, J.M. & Brink, J.R. van den & Jiménez-Losada, A., 2001. "Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Cooperative Games on Antimatroids," Discussion Paper 2001-99, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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