Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games
AbstractA class of cooperative games is introduced which arises from situations in which a set of agents is hierarchically structured and where potential individual economic abilities interfere with the behavioristic rules induced by the organization structure.These games form a cone generated by a specific class of unanimity games, namely those based on coalitions called peer groups. Different economic situations like auctions, communication situations, sequencing situations and flow situations are related to peer group games.For peer group games classical solution concepts have nice properties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91321.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (2002) v.55, p.93-106
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Other versions of this item:
- BrÃ¢nzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "Tree-connected Peer Group Situations and Peer Group Games," Discussion Paper 2000-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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