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How Transparent are Central Banks?

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  • Eijffinger, S.C.W.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Geraats, P.

Abstract

[Dataset available: http://hdl.handle.net/10411/14007]

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-88701.

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Length: 40
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-88701

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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References

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  1. Svensson, L.E.O., 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 595, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  2. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
  3. Frederic S. Mishkin & Adam S. Posen, 1997. "Inflation targeting: lessons from four countries," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 9-110.
  4. Svensson, Lars & Faust, Jon, 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies 669, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  5. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P.M., 2004. "How Transparent Are Central Banks?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 0411, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  6. Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 425-36, November.
  8. Geraats Petra M., 2005. "Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-28, February.
  9. Eric T. Swanson, 2004. "Federal Reserve transparency and financial market forecasts of short-term interest rates," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 2004-06, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  10. Geraats, P.M., 2001. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Papers 41, Quebec a Montreal - Recherche en gestion.
  11. Jensen, Henrik, 2001. "Optimal degrees of transparency in monetary policymaking," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,04, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  12. Charles Nolan & Eric Schaling, 1996. "Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Central Bank Accountability," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England 54, Bank of England.
  13. Cosimano, Thomas F & Van Huyck, John B, 1993. "Central Bank Secrecy, Interest Rates, and Monetary Control," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 370-82, July.
  14. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  15. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0026, European Central Bank.
  16. Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi & Daniel Gros, 2001. "Is the ECB Sufficiently Accountable and Transparent?," Economics Working Papers, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes 007, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes.
  17. Marvin Goodfriend, 1985. "Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  18. Tarkka, Juha & Mayes, David, 1999. "The Value of Publishing Official Central Bank Forecasts," Research Discussion Papers, Bank of Finland 22/1999, Bank of Finland.
  19. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  20. Demertzis, Maria & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2003. "Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003, Royal Economic Society 56, Royal Economic Society.
  21. Cukierman, A., 2000. "Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem," Papers, Tel Aviv 2000-4, Tel Aviv.
  22. Cukierman, Alex, 2001. "Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent about Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,05, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  23. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco & Schaling, Eric, 2000. "Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(2), pages 218-35, May.
  24. Jakob de Haan & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, 2000. "The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-tales," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 393-407, 09.
  25. Haan, J. de & Amtenbrink, F. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1998. "Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantification," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1998-54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  26. Rudin, Jeremy R., 1988. "Central bank secrecy, `fed watching', and the predictability of interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 317-334, September.
  27. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, 06.
  28. repec:fth:bfdipa:22/99 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Bhattacharya, Utpal & Weller, Paul, 1997. "The advantage to hiding one's hand: Speculation and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 251-277, July.
  30. Gabriel Pérez Quirós & Jorge Sicilia, 2002. "Is the European Central Bank (and the United States Federal Reserve) predictable?," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers, Banco de Espa�a 0229, Banco de Espa�a.
  31. Muscatelli, Anton, 1998. "Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability through Independence?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 529-42, March.
  32. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
  33. Donald L. Kohn & Brian P. Sack, 2003. "Central bank talk: does it matter and why?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 2003-55, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  34. Andrew Clare & Roger Courtenay, 2001. "Assessing the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on securities prices under different monetary policy regimes," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England 125, Bank of England.
  35. Svensson, Lars E. O., 2002. "Inflation targeting: Should it be modeled as an instrument rule or a targeting rule?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 771-780, May.
  36. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  37. Hans Gersbach, 2003. "On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 91-102, 08.
  38. Dotsey, Michael, 1987. "Monetary policy, secrecy, and federal funds rate behavior," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 463-474, December.
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