The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory
AbstractWe extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86781.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (2001) v.54, p.119-131
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
Other versions of this item:
- Martin Dufwenberg & Henk Norde & Hans Reijnierse & Stef Tijs, 2001. "The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 119-131, October.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Norde, Henk & Reijnierse, Hans & Tijs, Stef, 1998. "The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory," Working Paper Series 1998:11, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Dufwenberg, M. & Norde, H. & Reijnierse, H. & Tijs, S., 1998. "The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory," Papers 1998-11, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Voorneveld, M. & Kets, W. & Norde, H.W., 2005.
"An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets,"
2005-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Mark Voorneveld & Willemien Kets & Henk Norde, 2006. "An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 153-153, April.
- Mark Voorneveld & Willemien Kets & Henk Norde, 2005. "An axiomatization of minimal curb sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 479-490, November.
- Mosquera, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Voorneveld, M., 2008.
"Characterizing cautious choice,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-303496, Tilburg University.
- Voorneveld, Mark, 2002. "Preparation and toolkit learning," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 485, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Thomas Norman, 2005.
"Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces,"
Economics Series Working Papers
251, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Norman, Thomas W.L., 2008. "Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 610-627, March.
- Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December.
- Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, .
"Reflections on Equilibrium - Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2003-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2003. "Reflections on Equilibrium: Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 20, pages 257-302.
- Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Economists Online Support).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.