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The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory


Author Info

  • Dufwenberg, M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Norde, H.W.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Reijnierse, J.H.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University)


We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86781.

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Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (2001) v.54, p.119-131
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86781

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Cited by:
  1. Voorneveld, M. & Kets, W. & Norde, H.W., 2005. "An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets," Discussion Paper 2005-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Mosquera, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Voorneveld, M., 2008. "Characterizing cautious choice," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-303496, Tilburg University.
  3. Voorneveld, Mark, 2002. "Preparation and toolkit learning," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 485, Stockholm School of Economics.
  4. Thomas Norman, 2005. "Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces," Economics Series Working Papers 251, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December.
  6. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, . "Reflections on Equilibrium - Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  7. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.


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