The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory
AbstractWe extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86781.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (2001) v.54, p.119-131
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Other versions of this item:
- Dufwenberg, M. & Norde, H. & Reijnierse, H. & Tijs, S., 1998. "The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory," Papers 1998-11, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Norde, Henk & Reijnierse, Hans & Tijs, Stef, 1998. "The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory," Working Paper Series 1998:11, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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