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Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment - Professional rules of conduct and subject surrogacy

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  • Potters, J.J.M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Winden, F.A.A.M. van

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-84634.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2000) v.43, p.499-522
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-84634

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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References

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  1. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December.
  3. Selten,Reinhard, . "Evolution,learning and economic behaviour," Discussion Paper Serie B 132, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Dyer, D. & Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "A Comparison Of Naive And Experienced Bidders In Common Value Offer Auctions A Laboratory Analysis," Papers 11, Houston - Department of Economics.
  5. Douglas DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Wilfred Uecker, 1988. "A note on the use of businessmen as subjects in sealed offer markets," Artefactual Field Experiments 00039, The Field Experiments Website.
  6. Anderson, M.J. & Sunder, S., 1989. "Professional Traders As Intuitive Bayesians," GSIA Working Papers 88-89-51, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  7. Kenneth S. Chan & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller, 1998. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 1998-02, McMaster University.
  8. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1996. "Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 329-53.
  9. Potters, J.J.M. & Winden, F. van, 1992. "Lobbying and asymmetric information," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-223989, Tilburg University.
  10. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73373, Tilburg University.
  11. repec:feb:framed:00135 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Kagel, John H & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1379-91, December.
  13. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
  14. Douglas Dyer & John Kagel, 1996. "Bidding in common value auctions: How the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse," Framed Field Experiments 00144, The Field Experiments Website.
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Cited by:
  1. Offerman, T.J.S. & Potters, J.J.M., 2000. "Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Affect Consumers Prices? An Experimental Study," Discussion Paper 2000-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Jens Großer & Ernesto Reuben, 2009. "Redistributive Politics and Market Efficiency: An Experimental Study," Working Paper Series in Economics 44, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  3. Enrique Fatás & Tibor Neugebauer & Pilar Tamborero, 2004. "How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment," IESA Working Papers Series 0410, Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research.
  4. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2002. "Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse23_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
  5. Vetter, Stefan, 2013. "Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption: An experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 188-204.
  6. Finocchiaro Castro Massimo, 2004. "Cultural Education and the Voluntary Provision of Cultural Goods: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0404002, EconWPA.
  7. Goodwin, Paul, 2002. "Forecasting games: can game theory win?," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 369-374.
  8. Ahn, T.K. & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James, 2011. "Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(9), pages 1580-1589, July.
  9. David Cooper, 2006. "Are experienced managers experts at overcoming coordination failure?," Artefactual Field Experiments 00037, The Field Experiments Website.
  10. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2005. "Cultural Goods and Laboratory Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/06, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised May 2005.
  11. Hopfensitz, Astrid & Wranik, Tanja, 2009. "How to Adapt to Changing Markets: Experience and Personality in a Repeated Investment Game," TSE Working Papers 09-122, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  12. Enrique Fatás & Tibor Neugebauer & Pilar Tamborero, 2004. "How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/58, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  13. Pikulina, E.S. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Horst, J.R. ter & Tobler, P.N., 2013. "Overconfidence, Effort, and Investment," Discussion Paper 2013-035, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Edward J. Lopez & W. Robert Nelson, 2005. "The Endowment Effect in a Public Good Experiment," Experimental 0512001, EconWPA.
  15. Ahn, T.K. & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James, 2010. "A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2624-2633, October.

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